'agreed', the drafters of the road map intend to directly secure the agreement of the refugees themselves, beyond the agreement of their hard-pushed political representatives.
6
The three UN Security Council Resolutions cited in the road map broadly present and reaffirm the 'land-for-peace' formula now the basis of the two-state solution to the Israeli-Palestinian conflict explicitly recognized in UNSCR 1397 (2002), 7 within a framework of political negotiations between the parties and with an affirmation of the customary international law prohibition on the acquisition of territory by war. If the collective Palestinian right of self-determination is recognized through the vision of a Palestinian state articulated in resolution 1397, the issue of individual rights of the refugees is not. Back in 1948, the newly established state of Israel responded at the UN to calls for it to repatriate hundreds of thousands of Palestinians of refugees to the effect that this:
was not a question of the rights of certain individuals but of the collective interests of groups of people. It was not enough to allow these individuals to return when and where they desired, for the question arose as to who was to assume responsibility for their integration in their new environment.

8
A more recent quote presents the individual right of Palestinian refugees to return as threatening the Jewish people's collective right to self-determination as secured by the state of Israel. In recent weeks, Israel's Prime Minister is reported to be demanding that the Palestinians should renounce the right of return to areas inside Israel's 1948 borders as a pre-condition for implementation of the road map, because it is 'a recipe for the destruction of Israel'.
9
According to Ariel Sharon:
If there is ever to be an end to the conflict the Palestinians must recognize the Jewish people's right to a homeland, and the existence of an independent Jewish state in the homeland of the Jewish people. I feel that this is a condition for what is called an end to the conflict.[…] The end of the conflict will come only with the arrival of the recognition of the Jewish people's right to its homeland.
10
Leaving aside the issue of the individual right to return in situations of mass displacement, As demonstrated in the cases she considers (South Africa, Northern Ireland, Bosnia Herzogovina, and Israel/Palestine), while all three are inherently inter-connected, it is particularly the 'meta-bargaining' over 'the deal' on the collective rights (to self-determination) that implicates the handling of individual rights arising from past human rights violations and hence, the nature and extent of reparation due -as she puts it, "the trade-offs between different human rights provisions including in particular the relationship between group and individual rights".
14 Through a detailed examination of particular agreements from those four conflicts, Bell explores the justice and peace connection, the nature of which she finds in practice to be "problematic and controversial":
The view that human rights law provides unnegotiable minimum universal standards is often presented as in tension with the need for a pragmatic peace involving compromise, including compromise on human rights.
15
This is familiar from the assumption cited at the beginning of this paper. The tension -or dynamic -of "principle and pragmatism, or law and politics" 16 is addressed by Kader Asmal as the risk of a deadlock between "what might be called human rights fundamentalism, on the one hand, and cynical realpolitik on the other."
17
Speaking some years into the new South Africa, Asmal (South African Minister of Education at the time) locates himself as an international lawyer speaking "from a position well within the human rights discourse." With this discourse, he notes, with a tone of gentle self-mockery, We come up against the technocrats of the social sciences and of international relations. These are the hard men of realpolitik, the mandarins of statecraft, who view moralists as naïve children, lacking knowledge of the real world's harsh realities.
Asmal does not himself accept the dichotomy, and indeed his effort in the lecture (in 1999 at the LSE) is to set out in what ways he understands the South African approach to have "moved beyond the twin traps of naiveté and realpolitik,"
18
offering Nelson Mandela as an example of a 'third way.'
19
In the literature (and in the practice) of peace processes, the positing of tensions or dichotomies may pick out law/politics or principle/pragmatism, as cited above, or law/power, peace/justice, truth/justice, truth/reconciliation, depending on the dynamic and the particular situation that is being addressed. On the academic side, certain of these dynamics are closely implicated in increasing interest among international lawyers in the disciplinary theories of international relations. Slaughter et al note that for some this proceeds from a perceived "reality deficit" of the law:
international law is particularly susceptible to the siren call of social science, as it struggles perpetually with suspicions of its own irrelevance. international law "as an intellectual and practical enterprise" and to perceive "the integration of IR and IL scholarship" as "the natural corollary of the indivisibility of law and politics."
21
According to Slaughter et al, "insiders in both disciplines reject such facile distinctions" as "positive versus normative, politics versus law."
22
The burgeoning scholarly literature on transitional justice deals directly with the particular question of the 'justice-peace' formula worked out in the process of peace settlements. Colm Cambell et al explain 'transitional justice' as "a set of discourses" which focus on "the problem of reconciling the demands of peace with the imperatives of justice."
23
The issue of the right to return for Palestinian refugees directly provokes the justice-peace debate, as shown by the various quotes in this paper, and, as a "conflict-related legal legacy," falls clearly within the concerns of 'transitional justice' as thus defined: 
24
The peace processes in South Africa, Israel-Palestine and former Yugoslavia are among those that the authors identify as being more recently dealt with in the transitional justice literature.
25
While various criticisms are made of different aspects of the South African approach,
26
it is the case that Bell puts it first among her case studies in a summary ranking of the human rights measures included in the various peace deals "according to detail and capacity to deliver change." The Israel/Palestine "deal" comes last.
27
In fact, Bell holds that "in both their text and their implementation the Israeli/Palestinian peace agreements demonstrate an almost complete divorce between the concept of peace and the concept of justice."
28
In her categorization of three sets of human rights provisions typically contained in peace agreements, this is referring to the second set, the 'building for the future' provisions for human rights institutions. Her evaluation of the way in which the other two sets of human rights provisions fare in the Israel/Palestine peace agreements ('rights to self-determination' and past human rights violations) is equally negative. Journal (1990 Journal ( -1991 , at 2537-2615; and Bell, supra note 3, at 258 ff and sources at note 1. 39 The opposition of the USA to the mandate of the International Criminal Court (as compared with conflict-specific tribunals) is well documented. A recent press release by Amnesty International calls on the government of Bosnia and Herzogovina to refuse to sign an impunity agreement on which the US is insisting, under threat of withdrawal of military assistance. The agreement would commit the government "not to surrender US nationals accused of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes to the new International Criminal Court. Bell's comparison is based on a broad distinction between pre-negotiation, framework-substantive agreements and implementation agreements, although acknowledging inevitable overlaps in function and content and consequent challenges to the classification.
29
Her detailed comparison is between four sets of 'framework' peace agreements (the type of agreement "often marked by a handshake moment") 
33
Bell recognizes that a key difference between the Israel-Palestine agreements and those of the other three conflicts under examination is that the function of the former is to "build separate Israeli and Palestinian institutions and government, rather than designing ways to share both."
34
This critical distinction (based on the two-state solution) complicates the comparison considerably, but does not invalidate it.
The provisions of peace agreements regarding the return of refugees and displaced persons and property rights issues are in Bell's category of past human rights violations, or "past-focussed issues," along with issues of accountability for and (/or) 'truth about' abuses during the conflict.
35
The way the past is dealt with is "inextricably linked with how the agreement has dealt with selfdetermination" and raises "most graphically the justice-peace debate."
36
Thus, in the quote from Ariel Sharon above, peace (manifested as 'the end of the conflict') requires ab intitio the waiving of justice (as manifested by Palestinian refugees exercising their individual right to return including inside the 1948 borders). Sharon's articulation of the relationship, on the other hand, is in terms of a fit between peace and justice, with his presentation of the Jewish people's rights to selfdetermination being exercised inside the 1948 border. When combined with Sharon's apparent acceptance of a Palestinian 'state,' 37 the 'deal' here is presented as mutual recognition of collective rights to be exercised separately and to exclude the exercise of the individual right to return.
The different types of "past-focussed issues" considered by Christine Bell tend to be dealt with, as she points out, at different points in peace processes, and the discussions on measures taken and mechanisms established for the purpose of dealing with the past are increasingly informed by developments in mechanisms of both 'retributive' and 'restorative' justice. As for the first, the developing concept in international law of a 'duty to prosecute'
38
is not an explicit feature in the texts of peace agreements. The International Criminal Tribunal for former Yugoslavia was set up as the conflict was ongoing, rather than being established as part of the agreement between the parties, although subsequently its mandate was deferred to by both the process leading to and the text of the Dayton Peace Agreement in regard to the exclusion of persons indicted by the Tribunal from the negotiations and the exclusion from prisoner releases and amnesties of those charged with crimes within its jurisdiction.
39
The role played in peacemaking by the prosecution of perpetrators 40 Alejandra Vincente, 'Justice Against Perpetrators: The Role of Prosecution in Peacemaking and Reconciliation,' paper to the Badil seminar. 41 Article 147 of the Convention defines grave breaches as "those involving any of the following acts, if committed against persons or property protected by the present Convention: willful killing, torture or inhuman treatment, including biological experiments, willfully causing great suffering or serious injury to body or health, unlawful deportation or transfer or unlawful confinement of a protected person, compelling a protected person to serve in the forces of a hostile Power, or willfully depriving a protected person of the rights of fair and regular trial prescribed in the present Convention, taking of hostages and extensive destruction and appropriation of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out unlawfully and wantonly." is assessed in a separate paper, 40 but it is worth noting here that the application of 'retributive justice' through criminal prosecution, as one approach to dealing with the past, is not entirely in the hands of those negotiating the peace, or reliant on the international community for the establishment of tribunals. In the case of Israel as an Occupying Power, there is of course the explicit obligation to search for and prosecute those accused of grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention Relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War.
41
Israel's co-parties to the Convention have studiously ignored this obligation, although many have complied with the obligation to promulgate national legislation enabling such prosecutions to be launched against those 'of any nationality.' This may give a certain scope for those outside the political processes to take the law, so to speak, into their own hands, in their pursuit of justice; a recent case in point being the effort by lawyers in London to prompt a prosecution under the Geneva Conventions Act of Lieutenant General Shaul Mofaz on charges relating to events in the Jenin refugee camp in April 2002.
42
In a report commissioned against the background of the high-profile legal action against Ariel Sharon in the Belgian courts relating to the 1982 massacre of Palestinian refugees in Sabra and Chatila, Israel's Ministry of Justice was reported to have singled out Britain, Spain and Belgium as "the most likely to prosecute Israelis who breach international law."
43
This must be referring to the potential for initiatives originating in civil society, rather than state action; it is doubtful that the political leaders (or their civil servants) of any of the three countries named would see this form of justice as helpful contributions to their own foreign policy priorities. Indeed, following increasing numbers of legal actions against a range of foreign leaders, the Belgian authorities moved in April 2003 to amend the 1993 'anti-atrocity' legislation.
44
The extent of the amendments dismayed human rights organizations, which according to Human Rights Watch had "long proposed establishing Bell (273) points out that limited effect amnesties are likely to take place at different stages of peace processes: prisoner releases, for example, or the return of certain categories of refugees, as confidence building measures, or to enable key negotiators to participate in the process (her example here is South Africa), may occur at a very early stage (the pre-negotiation stage according to Bell, "by the framework-substantive agreement at the latest"). She contrasts these with "more holistic" or "comprehensive 'past-oriented' mechanisms" such as the Truth and Reconciliation Commission (TRC) in South Africa, which was based in a 'post-amble' to the Interim Constitution negotiated between the African National Congress and the then South African Government, but enacted as a mechanism only subsequent to the change in government. Bell finds only "piecemeal measures for dealing with discrete issues" in the Belfast Agreement and the Israeli-Palestinian agreements. Confusion around the standing of such limited measures in the IsraelPalestine context was highlighted recently with the arrest of Muhammad Abbas (Abu Abbas) in Iraq by US special forces. The press reported Italy's announcement that it would seek his extradition to face trial; Saeb Erekat insisted that PLO members must not be arrested or prosecuted for acts before the DoP, in accordance with the Interim Agreement signed inter alia by US President Bill Clinton; the Israeli Supreme Court was reported as having declared Abbas immune from prosecution in Israel in 1998, citing the Interim Agreement, while a radio interview with an Israeli spokesman appeared to suggest that subsequent acts on his part might change his status; and as for the US, while the Justice Department was reported as saying it had no grounds on which to seek his extradition since Washington had dropped a warrant for his arrest, a State Department official was quoted by Reuters as saying "that agreement only concerned arrangements between Israel and the Palestinian Authority" and "does not apply to the legal status of persons detained in a third country. 'filters' to prevent frivolous cases and render the law more politically viable."
45
It remains to be seen whether the new version is in practice a workable balance of law and politics. What may be less easy to track is whether, if serious concerns persist and are publicized in Israel (and specifically among the armed forces) about the implementation of national legislation providing for universal jurisdiction over allegations of grave breaches of the Fourth Geneva Convention, the deterrent effect of potential criminal justice proceedings against implicated Israeli nationals abroad will in fact help reduce the level of serious violations of international humanitarian law -which in turn could substantively promote the prospects for peace building.
46
The arguments around prosecution as a mechanism for establishing accountability for past abuses 47 are provoked inter alia by agreements on amnesty, which may be presented as key elements of transition to peace.
48
In this regard, Bell reports "evidence that the demands of international law for accountability have increasingly shaped domestic initiatives such as the establishment of truth commissions."
49
In a comparison of fifteen truth commissions written in 1994, Priscilla Hayner observes that "prosecutions are rare after a truth commission report," although her reference is explicitly to prosecutions in the national legal system.
50
In South Africa, Catherine Jenkins notes the case made for the application of a model of restorative justice, which included a provision for amnesty in the post-amble of the Interim Constitution and the Promotion of National Unity and Reconciliation Act of 1995 establishing the Truth and Reconciliation Commission. According to Jenkins, the restorative justice concept was identified "as a potential means of reconciling the political imperatives of new nationhood with the demands of human rights norms and the more traditional concept of retributive justice."
51
Also writing on South Africa, David Crocker describes restorative justice as "rehabilitating perpetrators and victims and (re)establishing relationships based on equal concern and respect." choices of a blanket amnesty and criminal prosecutions of perpetrators of gross human rights violations.
53
Among the elements that Jenkins (writing in 2000) regards as strengths in the system as set up by the Act were the potential for the disclosure and dissemination of information about violations (the need for 'the truth'), including the public and dignified space to be given to victims to tell their truths, the expectation that amnesty would involve an acknowledgement of wrongdoing on the part of the wrongdoers, the potential for achieving moral and social (if not legal) accountability, the requirement that the TRC "make recommendations for reparation measures for victims," and the combined potential of many of these elements for individual and society reconciliation and the building of a culture of human rights.
54
Many of these elements are included in the 'core content' of the concept of reparations as outlined below, a concept with critical significance for Palestinian refugees in its inclusion of restitution. It might be noted here that in specific regard to the Nakbah, Karma Nabulsi and Ilan Pappé have observed that "we can all look to South Africa for a practical model" in their call for mechanisms to "encourage the Israeli people to learn about their own past:" 
58
An earlier International Commission of Inquiry established by the UN had been mandated to collate information only on violations of 1999 when the Occupying Power, Indonesia, had finally left the territory after an occupation that had lasted since 1974. The Commission on Inquiry had recommended that the UN proceed with measures to ensure reparations for victims, consider "the issues of truth and reconciliation" and establish "an international human rights tribunal" to ensure the prosecution of those accused of "serious violations of fundamental human rights and humanitarian law" in the period within its mandate. Jenkins notes that no such tribunal had yet been established, and with particular regard to violations committed before 1999, cites Bishop Carlos Belo: 
eventually rejected by the ANC-led government as "too expensive"; the importance of reparations, she observes, "was undoubtedly under-estimated in South Africa and was perhaps the 'Achilles' heel' of the entire process."
61
Away from the experience of the TRC, a "titanic struggle" over land restitution and property rights in South Africa preceded agreement, in the Interim Constitution, on "a limited right to restitution under the rubric of the fundamental right to equality."
62
The subsequent Restitution of Land Rights Act of 1994 allowed for restitution claims dating back to 1913, with a wide definition of a 'right in land' and a provision "that direct descendents of the dispossessed (and not merely the dispossessed themselves) would be entitled to enforce restitution of a right in land."
63
Issues of current private ownership, the history of the dispossession, 'the uses to which the land is being put,' 'the desirability of avoiding major social disruption' whether restoration would be 'just and equitable,' the designation of a piece of alternative land from state ownership, or the payment of compensation in lieu thereof were among matters for consideration by the Land Claims Court; 64 claims for restitution were to be lodged by the last day of 1998. Jenkins' overview of the process reveals problems related to the length of time it was taking to settle the thousands of claims, the reduction in value of compensation awards and a move away from land restoration in urban areas:
Land restitution, once perceived as an essential part of redressing the injustices of the apartheid past and the suffering caused by forced removals, has come to be seen as an expensive millstone around the neck of the government.
65
Officials of the South African government have referred to the enormous financial implications of full and fair compensation in light of other social priorities pressing on the country's budget.
66
The lessons to be learned, for Jenkins, implicate both process -the need to design a mechanism capable of settling claims promptly, possibly implying an administrative rather than a judicial process in cases of compensation -and resources, with a warning that political and economic constraints "need to be taken realistically into account" at the design stage.
Jenkins also suggests that the international community consider ways in which "reparation for victims can be partly funded by the international community," The Draft Basic Principles explicitly adopt a "victim-oriented point of departure" and include both retributive 69 and restorative 70 approaches to justice. Specifically on reparation, they hold that states "should provide victims of violations of international human rights and humanitarian law the following forms of reparation: restitution, compensation, rehabilitation, and satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition."
71
They continue:
Restitution should, wherever possible, restore the victim to the original situation before the violations of international human rights or humanitarian law occurred. Restitution includes: restoration of liberty, legal rights, social status, family life and citizenship; return to one's place of residence; and restoration of employment and the return of property.
72
Measures of satisfaction and guarantees of non-repetition are to include, where applicable, "apology, including public acknowledgement of the facts and acceptance of responsibility."
73
In the case of the Palestinian refugees, Nabulsi and Pappé call on all those involved in resolving the conflict to have "the public courage to confront the Israeli denial of the expulsion and ethnic cleansing at the heart of the Palestinian refugee question," identifying this as "the single largest stumbling block towards a lasting peace between both peoples." The issue of restitution, as defined in the Draft Principles above, immediately implicates the 'pastfocussed issues' of refugees, the right to return and the restoration of property. In 1997, UN Special Rapporteur Awn al-Khasawneh explained the principle of restitutio in integrum as the remedy for population transfer: 
Restitutio in integrum […] aims, as far as possible, at eliminating the consequences of the illegality associated with particular acts such as population transfer and the implantation of settlers. A crucial aspect of this involves the right to return to the homeland or the place of original occupation in order to restore the status quo and to reverse the consequences of illegality. This right is recognized, for example, in relation to
76
He notes that this remedy "would also involve the payment of compensation to the victims and survivors of population transfers."
77
The following year, the Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities reaffirmed the "right of all refugees […] and internally displaced persons to return to their homes and places of habitual residence in their country and/ or place of origin."
78
In the preamble to the resolution the Sub-Commission recognized:
That the right of refugees and internally displaced persons to return freely to their homes and places of habitual residence in safety and security forms an indispensable element of national reconciliation and reconstruction and that the recognition of such rights should be included within peace agreements ending armed conflicts.
The Dayton Agreement contains extensive provisions for the rights of refugees and displaced persons in its Annex 7, including the concept of safe return (the conditions to which they are returning) and property rights. Paul Prettitore's case study for the Badil seminar, on housing and property restitution in Bosnia and Herzogovina, goes into considerable detail on the implementation of the provisions on property restitution as well as providing an overview of property repossession under different international law regimes.
79
A number of points of comparative interest arise from his evaluation, including his assessment that the process engaged by the Property Law Implementation Plan aiming at full implementation of the property laws "became truly effective when it moved from a political process driven by political forces to a rule of law process based on individual rights."
80
He also points up the advantages of an administrative rather than a judicial process for claims, including speedier resolution.
81
As regards compensation, although refugees and displaced persons were recognized in the Dayton Peace Agreement as having the right to compensation in cases where their property could not be restored, the designated mechanism (the Refugees and Displaced Persons Fund) has not been established ("no resources were made available") and "in practice compensation did not materialize as envisioned."
82
Once again, the issue of resources imposes itself on the implementation of recognized rights. 83 Bell, supra note 3, at 248-250. 84 
Compared to
Dayton, the provisions regarding refugees in the Israeli-Palestinian agreements so far concluded are minimal; indeed it is part of the 'deal' so far that the refugee issue is postponed till the final status agreement. Bell points out that there are in fact references in the Declaration of Principles to agreements to be made on admitting "persons displaced from the West Bank and Gaza Strip in 1967" (not 1948 refugees) and the establishment of the multilateral Refugee Working Group.
83
However, where Bell's comparison informs in this regard is the similarity she finds in that in both the Dayton Agreement and the existing Israeli-Palestinian agreements, the "metabargain failed to resolve the central conflict" which has been relocated, in part, to issues of return and access to land. In Bosnia and Herzogovina, she underlines "the significance of return for the self-determination deal through the assumption that large-scale returns would change the power balances and territorial realities of the separate Entities and unitary state structure agreed to in the DPA" and attributes to this what she considers (on figures from 1999) as a failure of implementation of Dayton's terms.
84
Prettitore provides updated figures of nearly a million returnees to pre-war homes and an up-beat assessment of 'strong progress' on property repossession. However, it is clear that much of the progress has been achieved not through the will and choice of the Entities and their agents but through the continuing involvement and pressure of the international community, including direct intervention in matters of domestic legislation and implementation by of the Office of the High Representative, and thus that Bell's assessment of the failure of the metabargain between the parties likely remains valid. The extent to which the international community was involved and remains involved in Dayton, and the role of third parties in securing Oslo is a closely related point of comparison that Bell makes between the peace deals in Bosnia and Herzogovina and Israel-Palestine, to be returned to shortly in this paper. Summarising 'pragmatic peace' arguments in response to the "refugee-specific 'just peace' thesis" advanced by the UNHCR, she states:
In short, return of refugees and land justice can begin to rewrite the territorial compromise at the heart of the deal, and this crucially affects bargaining over them. Even if return is provided for in a peace agreement, implementation will not necessarily follow. If return of refugees is a signifier of peace, then where the deal has failed to resolve the conflict (rather than just the violence)
, the conflict will continue to be waged not least through whether, how, and to where refugees and displaced persons are returned.
85
The legal basis of the established right to return of Palestinian refugees is not the subject of this paper.
86
However, it is worth noting that currently, the negotiating dynamics of the peace process, and the failure by the sponsoring third parties to affirm the right to return in their vision of a 'realistic peace,' certainly appear to contemplate Bell's scenario, where "the 'right of return' increasingly becomes subject to barter, effectively overwriting a plethora of General Assembly resolutions," 87 as well as, it might be added, strong positions in international human rights law.
88
In other conflicts, the Security Council as well as the General Assembly continues to reaffirm the right to return, and indeed the "right to return to one's home." In his 2002 report on "The return of refugees' or displaced persons' properties," Paula Sérgio Pinheiro cites the Security Council in recent years as having reaffirmed this principle "in resolutions addressing displacement in numerous countries and regions, including Abkhazia and the Republic of Georgia, Azerbaijan, Bosnia and Herzogovina, Cambodia, Croatia, Cyprus, Kosovo, Kuwait, Namibia and Tajijkistan." Assembly 
92
Having found the rights established and recognized, Pinheiro's conclusion is that what needs careful study is the "disjunction between existing standards and the reality on the ground."
93
Khasawneh's earlier report similarly raised the contrast between the recognition of restitutio in integrum as the remedy for population transfer, and the fact that this remedy may not be achievable in practice, as an illustration of the dissonance (or antagonism, as he puts it) between principle and pragmatism in negotiating peace: 
What is important to emphasize here is that the suggestion that restitutio in integrum should not always be insisted on touches on the fundamental question of the innate antagonism between peace and justice. Obviously restitutio in integrum is
94
We come, again, to the immediate implication of the right to return and to restitution (extrapolated into the politics of demographics and of land) in the justice-peace dynamic. Khasawneh's final observation goes clearly to the argument that at least sufficient justice is necessary if a peace is to last; and, of course, to the meanings of 'peace.' Pragmatism, as well as principle, requires addressing any perceived 'reality deficit' of the law in order for a workable 'justice/peace' formula to be agreed and sustained.
For a final comparison, illustrating also the involvement of 'unofficial' or civil society actors and their relationship with the guarantees offered by international law, we can take the Cyprus conflict. 95 The Security Council has endorsed this idea of "a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities […] in a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession. 98 For loss of use of the land, nor for 'expropriation' as she had been found to still be the legal owner; she had withdrawn a claim for the restoration of her rights. 99 Although the ECHR ruled nevertheless on Mrs Loizidou's rights, a number of its judges gave dissenting opinions on various grounds including that "it is impossible to separate the situation of the individual victim from the complex historical developments and a no less complex current situation" (dissenting opinion of Judge Bernhardt, 1996) and "Given that efforts are under way to arrive at a peaceful settlement of the Cyprus problem within UN, CE and other international bodies, a judgment of the European Court may appear as prejudicial" (dissenting opinion of Judge Jambrek 1996).
In recent developments, although no agreement has been reached at the time of writing, the parameters of the particular matters to which failure to reach agreement were attributed -publicly at least -would fit well with Bell's arguments on the meta-bargain. The UN-sponsored Set of Ideas on an Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus (1992) promotes reunification of the island along the broad lines of two federated states, "bi-communal as regards the constitutional aspects and bi-zonal as regards the territorial aspects," with detailed ideas for the federal constitution and references to agreements and arrangements yet to made between the parties in respect of issues such as territorial adjustments and displaced persons.
95
Under the original text it appears that the "option to return" may be "selected" only by "current permanent residents of Cyprus who at the time of displacement owned their permanent residence in the federated state administered by the other community and who wish to resume their permanent residence at that location." Those who were renting would be "given priority under the freedom of settlement arrangements." Other claims (including of heirs) would appear to fall to claims for compensation, which would be funded from the sale of properties transferred "on a global communal basis" between agencies acting for the two communities; other governments and organizations would be invited to contribute to this fund.
96
The initiatives of civil society actors brought the property-related grievances of Greek Cypriots to the European Court of Human Rights. In 1989, Mrs Titina Loizidou joined a march organized by the 'Women Walk Home Movement,' seeking to assert the right of Greek Cypriot refugees to return to homes they had left in 1974 when Turkish troops occupied the north of the island. Prevented from crossing by Turkish troops and then arrested by Turkish Cypriot police, she took her claim to the Court, which issued two rulings on the case.
97
In the first (1996) the ECHR found for the claimant, declining to recognize an "irreversible expropriation" of property in the north and holding that the denial of Mrs Loizidou's access to her property "and consequent loss of control thereof" was "imputable to Turkey." Arguing against the claim, the Turkish government argued, inter alia, that ruling on such matters "would undermine the intercommunal talks, which were the only appropriate way of resolving this problem." The ECHR found that this could not provide a justification under the European Convention. In the second decision, in 1998, the ECHR awarded Mrs Loizidou compensation for pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage 98 against the Turkish Government. The latter again made the case that "the question of property rights and reciprocal compensation is the very crux of the conflict in Cyprus" and "can only be settled through negotiations and on the already agreed principles of bi-zonality and bi-communality." It should be stressed that the creation of barriers to return has the clear effect of endorsing, and perpetuating, the initial policy of forcible mass transfer." 102 Id, at 14. 103 Failing agreement and the entry of Cyprus as a federated state, EU laws will apply only to the territory of the Republic of Cyprus, to be extended to the Turkish-controlled north of the island after reunification. The Guardian, 11 March 2003. 104 Id. Shortly after Cyprus' entry into the EU however, in what was seen as something of a surprise move, Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash announced the easing of travel restrictions and hundreds of Cypriots flowed north and south over the UN-patrolled 'Green Line.' Angelique Chrisafis reports Greek Cypriots "clutching branches of trees on their return from visiting houses they had not seen for thirty years…" The Guardian, 3 May 2003. Chrisafis reported the "wave of fraternization" as not free of misunderstandings: "One Turkish Cypriot woman reportedly died of a heart attack when Greek Cypriots visited her house saying it was theirs. They were only there to gather plant cuttings, but she feared she would be made homeless. Two Greek Cypriots are due in court after assaulting a Turkish Cypriot family for knocking on their door for the same reason." 105 The Economist, 8 March 2003 reported that some 70,000 people ("nearly half the North's population") demonstrated in favour of EU entry. 106 Bell, supra note 3, at 231.
With Turkey refusing to implement the Loizidou decision, the Attorney General of the Republic of Cyprus invited a group of international legal experts to provide an opinion on Turkey's position, including that: 
100
The experts consider factual situations of "forcible mass transfer or enforced displacement" under different provisions of international law 101 and advise the Republic of Cyprus that it "could not, consistently with its international obligations, accept or implement the proposal for a "Joint Property Claims Commission."
102
The legal and political battles over the land issue, mostly projected by the different sides of the argument as involving either individual or collective rights, were raised again at the beginning of this year when the UN Secretary General involved himself in particularly intensive efforts to encourage the parties to reach agreement on a settlement before Cyprus became a member of the EU in April.
103
The effort failed at the last minute; the Guardian reported that "the talks stumbled over Turkish insistence that their breakaway Cypriot state win full recognition, and demands by the Greeks for the right of refugees to return to homes in northern Cyprus that they left 29 years ago."
104
The intense and direct involvement of the UN Secretary-General in these efforts, and the UN role in the Set of Ideas, may suggest that Cyprus has features of the 'models' of Bosnia and Herzogovina and Israel-Palestine, in Bell's scheme, although the mass support reported as being shown for the reunification plan by Turkish Cypriots introduces a different dynamic.
105
In her comparison of the peace agreements in South Africa, Northern Ireland, Bosnia and Herzogovina, and Israel/Palestine, Bell observes that a superficial glance at the human rights provisions "would suggest (rather superficially) that the more internal a deal, the greater its human rights sophistication; and the more international, the less human-rights-friendly it is." pressures and motivations that are driving the need for a deal, and thus the extent to which shared interests perceived by the parties to the deal can be assisted through the language and content of human rights. She also notes, however, that there is an explanation in: 
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This observation underlines the importance of inclusion. At the current time, recognition of the right to return (as a right) for Palestinian refugees appears to be posited, in the 'realistic' (or 'realist'?) language of the road map, as impractical,' to return to the assumptions of the al-Badil seminar. In the positions articulated by Ariel Sharon cited at the beginning of this paper, and apparently across a broader constituency in Israel, it is treated as a political non-starter. Unsurprisingly, the perspectives of the Palestinian refugees appear not to coincide with this approach; and the law is on their side. 
